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Klim Voroshilov and the Red Cavalry: reassessing the most incompetent man in the Red Army

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³³ See, in particular, Baczkó, *Comment sortir de la Terreur*, passim; and idem., "Comment est fait un tyran..." Thermidor et la légende noire de Robespierre', in Jean Ehrard, ed., *Images de Robespierre*, Naples, 1996, pp.25-54.

³⁴ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 5:351.

³⁵ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 6:309.

³⁶ They showed 'not the least movement of sensitivity', Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 5:311.

³⁷ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 5:348. Prudhomme's paternalistic and sentimental language provides more evidence for the recent suggestion that familial disruption played a critical role in the Thermidorean imagination; see, for example, Suzanne Desan 'Reconstituting the social after the terror: family, property and the law in popular politics' *Past & Present*, 1999, pp.81-121.

³⁸ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 3:15.

³⁹ See Denby, *Sentimental narrative and the social order in France, 1760-1820*, pp.139-65. For a critical appraisal of the language of sentiment, see William Reddy, 'Sentimentalism and its Erasure: The Role of Emotions in the Era of the French Revolution', *Journal of Modern History* 72 (2000), pp.109-52.

⁴⁰ Only Prudhomme's estimate of judicial executions--18,603--remains reasonably close to the best modern estimates. His estimate of Carrier's victims in Nantes (close to 100,000) exceeded the pre-1789 population of the city, making the death toll highly dubious.

⁴¹ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 3:17.

⁴² Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 1: xxxi.

⁴³ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 1: xi.

⁴⁴ Prudhomme, *Histoire générale et impartiale des erreurs, des fautes et des crimes*, 4:67.

⁴⁵ Suzanne Desan has noted, in a different vein, the critical role of Thermidorean tutelage in family and divorce law, and argues that the period between 1795 and 1799 turned away from 'regeneration' and 'rights' to emphasise natural roles and duties. See Desan, 'Reconstituting the social after the terror'.

Klim Voroshilov and the Red Cavalry: Reassessing the Most Incompetent Man in the Red Army

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Cavalrymen have not had a good press in the twentieth century, especially when their responsibilities have extended outside their specialist field. In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Lloyd George blamed the 'ridiculous cavalry obsession' of his generals for the needless deaths of British soldiers in World War One.¹ A variation on this theme is to be found in the literature concerning the Red Army in the lead-up to the Second World War. Here the alleged culprit was Klim Voroshilov (1881-1969), the man chosen by Joseph Stalin to serve as Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs from 1925 to 1934 and Commissar for Defence from 1934 to 1940. Voroshilov gained his battlefield experience in the Russian Civil War of 1918-20 when he was a commander of the First Cavalry Army, the largest and most successful of the Red Army's cavalry units. For most commentators, Voroshilov remained throughout his life a cavalry enthusiast who 'insisted on a larger role in maneuver warfare being played by horse cavalry'² long after it was obvious that the age of the mounted soldier had passed. Voroshilov has assumed the role of an archetypal military villain, a 'dim-witted political general'³ and 'a talentless, unattractive mediocrity'⁴ whose passion for the cavalry and slavish devotion to Joseph Stalin helped to ensure that the Red Army was not ready to fight the early battles of World War Two.⁵

While it is not uncommon for soldiers to find that their careers are evaluated less positively after they have passed from the scene, Voroshilov's fall from grace was spectacular by any standards. A Bolshevik since 1903, Voroshilov found himself involved in the organisation of the Red Army at the outset of the Civil War in 1918. Despite the fact that he had no previous military experience, he rose to become an army and front commander. His alliance with Stalin began when the two men served as members of the revolutionary military councils that directed the Tenth Army and South Front in 1918. Voroshilov and Stalin teamed up again in 1919 to help organise the First Cavalry Army whose commander was the legendary cavalryman,

Semen Budennyi. Joining the revolutionary military council of the First Cavalry Army, Voroshilov acted as co-commander and political organiser of what would prove to be the Red Army's most successful cavalry unit. After the Civil War, Stalin relied upon veterans of the First Cavalry Army to consolidate his hold over the Soviet military establishment. Having taken over leadership of the Red Army in 1925, Voroshilov initiated the Stalin cult by writing the hagiographic *Stalin and the Civil War* which first appeared in 1929. The favour was returned when Soviet literature of the 1930s exaggerated Voroshilov's achievements in the Civil War, passed over in silence his defeats and praised him as a military organiser of genius.

After Stalin's death, Voroshilov fell from favour with Khrushchev and his involvement in the failed 'Anti-Party Plot' ensured that during the last eleven years of his life, he was subjected to increasing criticism. In particular, Voroshilov fared badly in comparisons with his great rival and deputy of the inter-war years, Mikhail Tukhachevskii.⁶ Tukhachevskii served as a tsarist officer in World War One, was the Red Army's most successful commander in the Civil War and in the 1920s earned a reputation as a military theorist of world standing. Soviet writers in the era of de-Stalinisation considered that Tukhachevskii was the real leader of the Red Army and its likely commander-in-chief were war to have broken out. Whether this would indeed have happened will never be known for Tukhachevskii was the most famous victim of the notorious military purge that struck the Red Army in the late 1930s. The arrest and execution of Tukhachevskii in June 1937 was the trigger for the removal of thousands of Red Army officers from their posts, effectively decapitating the Red Army on the eve of World War Two.

Veterans of the First Cavalry Army were the only group to survive the purge of the high command more or less intact.⁷ John Erickson and Robert Conquest have argued that the impetus for the military purge came from Stalin and that the dictator's determination to rid civilian politics of all those who were not his creatures inevitably extended to the military command.⁸ The leaders of the First Cavalry Army were spared because they represented the only group within the high command whose loyalty had never been in question. Other commentators have speculated that Voroshilov may not simply have presided over the purge on Stalin's orders but actively pursued the destruction of his fellow commanders. We now know that discussions were held in 1936 between Tukhachevskii and fellow

officers as to ways of bringing about the dismissal of Voroshilov.⁹ Attention has been called to Voroshilov's background in the Red cavalry and the siege mentality of the mounted arm in the face of what appeared to be inevitable redundancy once sufficient tanks were available.¹⁰ On the surface, it seems plausible that the military purge was, at least in part, a cavalryman's coup by means of which Voroshilov aimed to preserve his leadership and safeguard the future of the Red cavalry.

There is no space here to reassess every aspect of Voroshilov's fifteen-year reign over the Red Army. This paper is limited to reassessing a key charge against Voroshilov, his alleged obsession with the Red cavalry. It will be argued that Voroshilov's cavalry bias was a figment of the imagination of Soviet historians writing in the era of de-Stalinisation, an assessment that soon found an echo in accounts of the Red Army that would appear in the West. Evidence that Voroshilov acted as an advocate of the Red cavalry comes mainly from his public pronouncements. Thus, Voroshilov boasted to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 that cavalry numbers had increased by 52% between 1935 and 1939.¹¹ A year earlier he gave an assessment of the Red cavalry that claimed:

Cavalry in every army of the world is undergoing or, more accurately, has undergone, a crisis and in many armies has completely died out... We take a different view... The Red cavalry, as before, is a battle-winning and crushing military force that can and will decide military tasks on all fronts.¹²

Quotations such as the one above are often cited to demonstrate Voroshilov's misplaced faith in mounted warfare but are misleading when viewed in isolation. It would be easy, on the basis of Voroshilov's speeches, to show that the Defence Commissar supported each and every part of the Red Army. Official Soviet discourse did not allow for public debate of sensitive issues. To establish Voroshilov's views, we need to examine not just his published writings and speeches but also the private comments he made in discussions with his fellow commanders of the Red Army. Among the documents made available from Soviet archives in recent years are the transcripts of the discussions held at the annual review and planning meetings of the Red Army. Until 1934, the most senior commanders of the Red Army met as members of the Revolutionary Military Council or *Revvoensovet*, and thereafter as members of an advisory Defence Council attached to

the Defence Commissariat.¹³ Voroshilov's public support for the Red cavalry did not carry through into these private discussions involving his fellow Red Army commanders. Underlying his commentary on the Red cavalry is a consistent concern about the likely impotence of cavalry in a future war, a concern that places Voroshilov squarely in the camp of the cavalry sceptics and not of the cavalry enthusiasts.

Preparing the Red cavalry for modern warfare was one of the great challenges for the Soviet military establishment of the inter-war period. The Red cavalry of the 1920s was called upon to learn to fight dismounted, to shoot more accurately and to cooperate more effectively with infantry, machine guns and artillery. It was recognised that the cavalry would need aerial support, anti-aircraft guns and tactical refinements designed to offer protection from air attack. In addition, the cavalry was expected to know how to move at night, to find shelter in forests and to ford major rivers. The Red cavalry struggled to meet the objectives set for it. Veteran cavalrymen accepted the importance of firepower but insisted that proper training in the traditional cavalry skills was also necessary. Heading the Red cavalry for much of the inter-war period was one such veteran, Semen Budennyi, the founder of the First Cavalry Army and the Red Army's Inspector of Cavalry from 1924 to 1937. Budennyi and Voroshilov remained life-long friends but the same could not be said of Budennyi's relationship with Tukhachevskii or the other principal moderniser of the inter-war period, Vladimir Triandifilov. In his *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies* published in 1929, Triandifilov wrote that cavalry could participate in modern war only by means of fire weapons and ruled out altogether the use of charges in formation or cold steel.¹⁴ The ripostes from Budennyi were often vitriolic betraying the insecurity of many Red cavalrymen.

Historians have tended to conflate the outlook of Voroshilov and Budennyi on the issue of the Red cavalry. Budennyi was a dyed-in-the-wool cavalryman whose handlebar moustache and cavalry experience extended back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Budennyi represented a xenophobic, anti-modern trend in the Red Army. He complained that the secret collaboration with the German Army in the 1920s was 'turning the heads of the Red Army's young commanders'.¹⁵ Voroshilov, by contrast, was one of the Red Army's staunchest supporters of the military collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic. Triandifilov noted in 1927 that 'we argue about cavalry every year... in the past year only Voroshilov has

supported me'.¹⁶ In 1928, Voroshilov asked Alexander Egorov, an ally from the Civil War to tone down his criticisms of Tukhachevskii's leadership of the Red Army's failed attack on Warsaw in August 1920.¹⁷ Voroshilov's displays of even handedness extended to the Red cavalry's supporters as well as to its critics. In 1928 when a draft containing the damning judgment that 'cavalry was not prepared or suited to modern war' was submitted to the Revvoensovet, Voroshilov argued that the offending passage be struck out of the final report.¹⁸

In part, Voroshilov strove to appear objective in disputes among his subordinates in order to establish his authority over a military establishment that retained a degree of independence until the 1937 purge. On the other hand, Voroshilov could not help but make his reservations about the mounted arm known. Reviewing the Red Army's performance each year, Voroshilov was often critical of each arm of the Red Army, but he often reserved his most damning remarks for the cavalry. In 1929, Voroshilov summed up the Red cavalry's performance in bleak terms, noting that the Red cavalrymen were quite good with their horses and weapons but as units they were failing in their tasks. Voroshilov complained that the Red cavalry had gone backwards since the Civil War for it could no longer cooperate effectively with artillery and machine gunners. He was unhappy with the reconnaissance over both short and longer distances while the work of guarding the cavalry on the move and at rest was equally bad. Voroshilov virtually wrote off the previous seven years of training when he complained that 'at present the Red cavalry could do little more than shout hurrah and charge'. The vulnerability of cavalry to attack from the air especially troubled Voroshilov who reminded Budennyi that during the Civil War, the First Cavalry Army's worst defeat was brought about by Polish aircraft, who slaughtered fifteen hundred cavalrymen on a single day in August 1920.¹⁹

The Red Army was to be transformed by the first Five-Year Plan that got under way in 1928. By the mid 1930s, the Red Army had an army of tanks and aircraft that for the most part lived up to Soviet boasts of having a modern fighting force the equal of any in the world.²⁰ The enthusiasm underlying the development of new equipment for the Red Army had its counterpart in the military theorising of Tukhachevskii, Triandifilov and others about how to use the tanks and planes in a series of crushing blows aimed at the deep rear of the enemy. This idea of 'deep battle' and later 'deep operations' became part of Red Army doctrine and the writings of

Tukhachevskii and his fellow modernisers earned praise around the world. Ironically, mechanisation led to a second lease of life for the Red cavalry whose numbers increased substantially in the mid 1930s. In 1929, there were twelve cavalry divisions with a total strength of 77,000 sabres.²¹ In 1935 the number of cavalry divisions increased to thirty-two, albeit in a period when the Red Army more than doubled in size. It was neither Budennyi's histrionics nor favouritism on the part of Voroshilov that lay behind this cavalry revival but Tukhachevskii's concept of deep battle. Initially, deep battle assumed close cooperation between tank formations, infantry and cavalry. The first stage, the forming of the breach, did not involve cavalry but the second stage of developing the tactical success would require the mobility not only of large tank units but 'mechanised' cavalry, meaning cavalry units supported by tanks and infantry.²² Tukhachevskii not only welcomed the creation of two cavalry corps in 1932, but he was almost apologetic for his earlier disparaging of the Red cavalry. As Tukhachevskii put it, 'a few years back we were talking about the end of cavalry but now the role of cavalry has grown significantly – specifically with the advance of mechanisation'.²³

Budennyi was especially happy with this new state of affairs. With an evident sense of self-justification he noted that:

For many years everybody cursed the cavalry. But that was because they did not understand it. Now great changes are happening in our country. We are changing too and so too are our tactics and operative art. If in the past we thought the way forward was to smash the forward defences of the opponent now we demand that the opponents whole system of defence be attacked in all of its depth not only from a tactical point of view but from an operational point of view.²⁴

Voroshilov, by contrast, took little comfort in this temporary detente among his subordinates. Voroshilov was neither satisfied with the theory of deep battle, nor with the performance of the Red cavalry. He did not think that deep battle was particularly new given that punching a hole in the enemy's defences and exploiting the breach with cavalry was the thinking at the outset of World War One. Voroshilov complained that Tukhachevskii failed to take into account that the enemy would be moving and that therefore there would not be a static defence to be penetrated. Voroshilov did not see how the tanks could be properly supported and he worried about the tank's vulnerability to

anti-tank aircraft. Voroshilov may have missed the subtler points of deep battle but he was not arguing for the tank to be replaced by the horse. Voroshilov fully supported the Red Army's mechanisation even if he argued constantly with Tukhachevskii about how this was to be achieved. Thus, in 1930 Voroshilov, backed by Stalin, engaged in a major dispute with Tukhachevskii over the latter's plans for mechanising the army. The point of contention was not any conservatism on the part of Stalin and Voroshilov but whether the necessary resources could be found to turn Tukhachevskii's plans into reality.²⁵

Even as cavalry numbers were increased in 1935, Voroshilov declared himself unimpressed by arguments from the cavalry that the dismounted cavalryman was as good as an infantryman. Cavalry was a poor substitute for infantry because only two out of three cavalymen were able to fire their rifle while the third tended to the horses. Dive-bombers and chemical weapons were, in Voroshilov's opinion, insurmountable obstacles for the cavalry. In 1935, Voroshilov addressed Budennyi directly:

I don't know whether Semen Mikhailovich (Budennyi) will agree with me. As an old cavalryman he is fond of cavalry in its pure form, so to speak. He finds it hard to accept the loss of cavalry of a type that has existed for centuries.²⁶

Voroshilov did not mince his words, remarking that:

I must say that my impression is that in present conditions, given the contemporary *tekhnika* of the enemy, given the fact that the enemy is able to use fire from the ground and from the air and has the capacity to use chemical weapons, cavalry will find it very difficult to fight at all.²⁷

At the end of 1935, the Soviet military establishment seemed to be at the peak of its power and prestige.²⁸ The military budget was huge, the Red Army boasted many more tanks and aircraft, the post of marshal was reintroduced with Voroshilov, Tukhachevskii, Budennyi, Alexander Egorov and Vasilii Bliukher being the first five to be so honoured. Many cavalry units were now renamed as Cossack units as so many of them were known in the Russian Army. On the other hand, 1936 saw not just the first of the civilian 'show trials' but an increasing number of arrests of Soviet military personnel. One of the

few acknowledgments handed out by historians to Voroshilov is that he successfully quarantined the military from the less murderous purges of 1929-30 and 1933-34.²⁹ Far from welcoming the new purge, Voroshilov tried an argument that had worked in the past, that the armed forces attracted more politically conscious personnel than other areas of the Soviet state. At the February-March plenum in 1937, Voroshilov contended that not many wreckers had been discovered, the reason being that the military attracted the best and most loyal citizens of the Soviet state. Molotov contradicted Voroshilov and refused to accept that the military was immune to infiltration by scheming wreckers and Gestapo agents.³⁰ Soon after, Voroshilov fell into line and did all that was asked of him in carrying out the purge. At his trial, Tukhachevskii was accused of working for the Nazis, plotting against Voroshilov and being biased against the Red cavalry. The last charge was made by Budennyi. While it is now apparent that the purge took a smaller percentage of the high command than previously thought – earlier accounts estimated that as many as half the total number of officers were purged³¹ – the havoc wreaked at the very top of the Red Army and the gradual progress downwards of the arrests and executions into the lower ranks undid years of effort and planning. Voroshilov made no effort to save any of his fellow officers or their families. Whether he had come to believe the charges against his former colleagues or whether he acted as he did for reasons of self-preservation or vengeance is impossible to know.

What is clear is that the purge did not coincide with any change in attitude on the part of Voroshilov towards the Red cavalry. Voroshilov's address to the surviving members of the Military Council at the end of 1937, now dominated by veterans of the Red cavalry, did little to ease the apprehension of the cavalry leaders. Voroshilov acknowledged that there were theatres of war such as the East and Near East where cavalry still might play a role but emphasised that 'we have to reduce the cavalry in size and increase the size of other arms'. The Defence Commissar was of the opinion that in future it was likely that 'cavalry will play a truly modest role on our western theatre, archmodest, perhaps an auxiliary, third-rate role'. Voroshilov was just as adamant at this meeting that large tank formations would remain, that they were necessary 'for contemporary battle, for contemporary war'.³² Budennyi objected strongly to Voroshilov's assertion that the Red Army had 'plenty of cavalry', retorting that there was 'very little cavalry, in fact' and claimed that 'as soon as the

war begins all will shout give us cavalry'. Voroshilov's response was unyielding:

You are talking with your cavalryman's heart and I well understand it. As a man and a cavalryman I sympathise... But reality is moving away from us and we would be cavalymen of the medieval type – Don Quixote was a cavalryman too – if we do not take account of reality.³³

Cavalry numbers were not as meagre as Budennyi made out but had indeed stagnated after the expansion of 1935. During the purge years of 1936 to 1939 the number of cavalry divisions remained the same while the number of infantry divisions increased from ninety to one hundred and fifty.³⁴ As a Soviet history of the Red cavalry put it, many cavalymen survived the purge only to be retrained as tank drivers.³⁵ If the purge really were a cavalryman's coup aimed at preserving the mounted arm, it clearly failed in its mission.

Voroshilov was removed as Commissar for Defence in 1940 after the disastrous winter war with Finland. His place was taken by another veteran of the First Cavalry Army, Semen Timoshenko. A damning report was prepared on Voroshilov's failure to resolve the Red Army problems although one of the few accusations not to be made against him was that he had relied too much on cavalry. When the Nazi thunderbolt fell on 22 June 1941 Stalin responded by dividing his front line into three commands, with Voroshilov taking the northwestern part of the line, Timoshenko put in charge of the centre and Budennyi the south. It was a measure of how much Stalin valued political loyalty in the army. As the entire front crumbled under the German onslaught all three former cavalymen were replaced, none showing any particular ability for field command in modern conditions albeit in a situation that would have tested the most gifted commander. In the Civil War, Voroshilov taught himself to shoot and ride with the best of the men he led but his strengths lay in organisation and personal bravery, not in tactics or strategy. Voroshilov's value to the Red Army in the 1920s and 30s was always going to be as an administrator and advocate of the armed forces to its political masters not as a military theorist or fighter in the field.

The idea that Voroshilov was obsessed with the Red cavalry was an invention of de-Stalinisation, a convenient way to contain as much as possible the blame for the military purge and the Red Army's poor showing in 1941. Voroshilov was an excellent military villain, a vain

and uneducated Communist upstart who was so stupid as to believe that the Red Army could sabre its way to victory in the coming war. The scapegoating of Voroshilov was able to build on images of discredited World War One generals hopelessly out of touch with the new weaponry and refighting the battles of the Napoleonic era. Voroshilov was an excellent foil to the able Tukhachevskii, the latter held up as the model of a good Communist and a truly professional soldier. That these stories were unhelpful caricatures is all too obvious now. Voroshilov was not opposed to tanks, nor did he favour the cavalry. Tukhachevskii's plans were often unrealistic and he helped to prepare his own demise by taking part in the removal and humiliation of fellow veterans of the tsarist army.³⁶ From the litany of woes that beset the Red Army on the eve of World War Two, we can at least subtract one of its alleged weaknesses. While Voroshilov must take his share of the blame for the failings of the Soviet military establishment, the Red Army did not suffer for fifteen years under the leadership of a man inflexibly committed to the cavalry arm.

NOTES

- ¹ D Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, Vol. 2, London, 1933-36, p.2038.
- ² Steven Zaloga, 'Soviet Tank Operations in the Spanish Civil War', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 12, 3, September 1999, p.155.
- ³ David R Stone, *Hammer and Rifle. The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933*, Lawrence, 2000, p.21.
- ⁴ Dmitrii Volkogonov, 'Voroshilov' in Harold Shukman, ed, *Stalin's Generals*, New York, 1993, p.324.
- ⁵ Despite the fact that he led the Red Army for fifteen years there is still no academic monograph in English devoted to Voroshilov's life and career. In the Soviet era there were two main works in Russian, V. Akshinskii, *Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov: Biograficheskii Ocherk*, Moscow, 1968; V. Kardashov, *Voroshilov*, Moscow, 1976.
- ⁶ See, for example, A I Todorsky, *Marshal Tukhachevskii*, Moscow, 1963.
- ⁷ See Vitaly Rapoport and Yuri Alexeev, *High Treason. Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-1938*, Durham, 1985, pp.271-282.
- ⁸ John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command A Military-Political History 1918-1941*; London and Boulder, 1984; Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror. A Reassessment*, London, 1990.

- ⁹ Lennart Samuelson, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine, Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925-1941*, Basingstoke, 2000, p.187.
- ¹⁰ See, for example, A A Kokoshin, *Armiia I Politika*, Moskva, 1995, pp.88-90.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² K Voroshilov, 'XX let Raboche-krestianskoi Krasnoi Armii I Voennomorskogo Flota', *Voennaia Mysl*, 1938, 3, p.13.
- ¹³ The relevant archive is *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv*, The Russian State Military Archive, fond 4 (hereafter RGVA).
- ¹⁴ See V Triandifillov, *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*, trans. William A Burhans, Ilford, 1994, pp.60-61.
- ¹⁵ RGVA/4/10/72, p.164.
- ¹⁶ RGVA/4/1/756, p.97.
- ¹⁷ Samuelson, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine*, p.208.
- ¹⁸ RGVA/4/1/756, p.3.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Stone, *Hammer and Rifle*, p.216.
- ²¹ A. Soshnikov et al, *Sovetskaia kavalertiia*, Moskva, 1984, p.142.
- ²² M V Zakharov, *Generalnyi shtab v predvoennye gody*, Moskva, 1989, pp.90-5.
- ²³ RGVA/4/18/39, p.110.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p.61.
- ²⁵ Samuelson, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine*, p.119.
- ²⁶ RGVA/4/18/53, pp.714-15.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, p.402.
- ²⁹ Ibid., pp.325, 374.
- ³⁰ Antonella Cristiani and Vera Michaleva, *Repressii v krasnoi armii (30-e gody)*, Dipartimento di Scienze, Napoli, 1996, pp.44-5.
- ³¹ For an account of the numbers, see Roger Roi Reece, *Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers. A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941*, Kansas, 1996, pp.132-63.
- ³² RGVA/4/18a/54, pp.482-85.
- ³³ RGVA/4/18a/54, p.482.
- ³⁴ Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, pp.766-77.
- ³⁵ Soshnikov, *Sovetskaia kavalertiia*, p.153.
- ³⁶ Samuelson, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine*, p.209.